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The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa:
Ottumwa's Meatpacking Workers,
1937-1954
WILSON J. WARREN
THE NEW DEAL PERIOD saw the resurgence of organized
labor in American politics. The commitment of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to industrial unionism
sparked much of this revival. CIO organizing efforts strategi-
cally tapped segments of America's work force engaged espe-
cially in unskilled and semiskilled factory work. Labor histori-
ans have typically focused on union-building efforts in large
urban areas where African-Americans and first- and second-
generation Americans from southern and eastern Europe pre-
dominated. These groups of workers have also received the
most attention from those working-class historians who have
more recently been concerned with the sources of dissension
that started to undermine industrial unions and their larger
political impact in the post-World War II period.'
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 1991 Congress of His-
torical Organizations, Des Moines, Iowa. I am grateful to Ralph Scharnau for
his critique of that paper. Mark L. Smith, secretary-treasurer of the Iowa Fed-
eration of Labor, AFL-CIO, graciously allowed me access to and permission to
cite the interviews with Ottumwa meatpacking workers included in the Iowa
Labor History Oral Project, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
1. This characterization of the explicit and implicit ethnic and racial empha-
ses of historians of the CIO applies to much of the older as well as more
recent studies in the field. See, for example, Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent
Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1941 (Boston, 1970); Peter
Friedlander, The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939: A Study in Class and
Culture (Pittsburgh, 1975); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Black Detroit
and the Rise of the UAW (New York, 1979); Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at
Home: The CIO in World War ¡I (Cambridge, 1982); Ronald Edsforth, Class
Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in
THE ANNALS OF IOWA 51 (Spring 1992). ©The State Historical Society
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Workers also organized CIO locals in many of Iowa's
industrial communities. Historians have largely ignored Iowa
because tbe profiles of most of the state's industrial cities dur-
ing the period did not correspond to those of tbe larger indus-
trial cities in which the CIO took hold. Most of Iowa's manufac-
turing cities were smaller, most contained only one or two large
industries, and they usually did not include significant num-
bers of new immigrant or nonwhite workers. By examining the
evolution of tbe CIO movement in Ottumwa, particularly at the
John Morrell and Co. meatpacking plant, it is possible to assess
the origins and eventual sources of conflict in the crucial period
from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s in a portion of America's
labor movement that historians typically neglect.^
Ottumwa's meatpacking workers formed a packing com-
munity out of which they forged a CIO movement during the
late 1930s to early 1940s. The community was characterized by
a closely knit neighborhood and a shared cultural identity. The
CIO movement expressed the workers' desire to eliminate the
company's "drive" system of supervision and dictatorial mana-
gerial control. Workers sought greater participation in the pro-
duction process partly through collective bargaining. Tbeir soli-
darity also made it possible to assert their collective power on
the shop floor. Finally, tbey translated the union drive at the
plant into a larger political movement that gave the packing
community a more powerful voice in the city's politics as a
whole.
Flint. Michigan (New Brunswick, NJ, 1987); Gary Gerstle, Working-Class
Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914-1960 (Cambridge,
1989); and Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago,
1919-1939 (Cambridge, 1990).
2. James C. Larew's A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, 1950-1974 (Iowa
City, 1980) is one of the very few studies that treats the impact of the CIO and
organized labor on the political landscape in Iowa. My forthcoming disserta-
tion, "Working-Class Structural Pluralism and the Limits of the New Deal
Order: Midwestern Meatpacking Workers, 1935-1955" (University of Pitts-
burgh), explores workers' union and partisan political behavior in Omaha,
Topeka, St. Joseph, and Ottumwa. I selected these communities so I could
focus on their diverse economic and social demographic characteristics. In
each community, ethnic, racial, and/or urban-rural conflicts contributed to
the limits of meatpacking workers' reform efforts.
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Between 1945 and 1954 class conflict shook the Morrell
plant and Ottumwa's politics, as Morrell's management and
Ottumwa's business and professional groups offered a unified
response to the packing community's challenge to their power.
The company adopted new managerial strategies and employ-
ment policies designed to strike at the heart of the packing com-
munity's solidarity, which eroded considerably after the
nationwide United Packinghouse Workers of America (CIO)
strike in 1948. Although Morrell did not eliminate the union
from the plant, the company and its business and professional
allies in the city did curtail the union's power to influence cru-
cial production decisions on the shop floor and blunted much
of its citywide political influence. By the mid-1950s, the local
union at Morrell no longer embraced a packing community.
DURING THE MID-1930s, Ottumwa's packing workers
shared a cohesive class and cultural identity. In addition to a
collective neighborhood, cultural, religious, and associational
identity, their sense of community had also been shaped by a
shared sense of grievance about their position in the city rela-
tive to its elites. Ethnicity and neighborhood ties among
Ottumwa's packing workers had been evident as early as 1900.
In that year, 60 percent of Morrell's employees were native-
born of native parents; the remaining 40 percent consisted of
mostly second-generation and some foreign-born Americans of
English, Irish, Swedish, and German descent. About two-thirds
of the packing community resided in the immediate environs of
the plant in Ottumwa's east end. These patterns changed little
by 1915.3
Especially during the 1920s and early 1930s, broader cul-
tural alliances solidified the packing workers' sense of a shared
identity. By 1935 almost all of the city's Morrell workers were at
3. The profile of the Morrell work force for 1900 is based on a compilation of
information on 1,131 people who worked at the plant between February
1899 and June 1900. The names were gathered from McCoy's Ottumwa City
Directory for 1899-1900, the U.S. manuscript census for 1900, and a plant
timebook from 1899 (located in box 24, John Morreil and Company Records,
Special Collections, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City), The profile of
the work force for 1915 is based on information gathered on 1,044 Morrell
employees listed in the State of Iowa manuscript census for that year
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least second-generation Ottumwans or native-born Americans
of English, Swedish, or German descent who had migrated
from the nearby towns and rural areas of south central Iowa.
During the 1920s, especially, a large portion of the rural popu-
lation of south central Iowa migrated to Ottumwa and some
other cities of the region.* Many Morrell workers had grown up
in farming families or had participated in the small-scale coal-
mining industry that dotted the region. Of the latter, many
brought with them to Morrell prior affiliations with the United
Mine Workers.^  Morreil's work force consisted in large part of
fundamentalist Protestants who attended churches that
espoused an evangelical and often millennial Christian mes-
sage of spiritual conversion.* Only a handful of fraternal orga-
4. Because of the unavailability of census records for the years since 1925,
my assessment of workers' ethnicity and nativity in 1935 is based on my sur-
name analysis of a random sample of 127 Morrell employees taken irom the
1935 McCoy's Ottumwa City Directory and the information provided by 30
Ottumwa Courier obituaries of Monell workers who had worked at the plant
in 1935 and who died between 1988 and 1991. In my analysis of workers'
probable ethnic background, I relied especially on two surname dictionaries,
Patrick Hanks and Flavia Hodges, A Dictionary of Surnames (Oxford, 1988),
and Eldson C. Smith, New Dictionary of American Family Names (New York,
1973). The population shift from rural to urban areas is suggested by the fact
that between 1920 and 1930 the south central counties of Wayne, Lucas,
Marion, Mahaska, Monroe, Appanoose, Davis, Wapello, Keokuk, Jefferson,
and Van Buren lost 12 percent of their population while Ottumwa's popula-
tion increased by 22 percent. See Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940,
vol. 1, Population.
5. The connection between coal-mining and meatpacking unions was noted
explicitly by Donald Harris, the CIO's Packinghouse Workers' Organizing
Committee's first national director, in his interview with Paul Kelso, 8 June
1978, Iowa Labor History Oral Project (ILHOP), State Historical Society of
Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City. Additional insight into the importance of former
United Mine Workers activists in Iowa's packing industry is provided in
Roger Horowitz, "'It Wasn't a Time lo Compromise': The Unionization of
Sioux City's Packinghouses, 1937-1942," Annals of Iowa 50 (1989/1990),
247.
6. Some insight into the religious identifications of the city's packing work-
ers is suggested by the types of churches established in the city between 1922
and 1939. Nine new churches were established in Ottumwa during these
years: the Fundamentalist Baptist Church, Community Christian Church,
Chapel of the Church of God, Pentecostal Church of God, Church of the
Nazarene, North Church of the Nazarene, Central Addition Pentecostal
Church, First Church of the Open Bible, and Harding Park Open Bible
Church, Each was situated in predominately blue-collar residential areas.
See McCoy's Ottumwa City Directory, 1922; and Polk's Ottumwa City Direc-
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nizations catered to workers, but increasing numbers socialized
together in the city's Eagles, Moose, and American Legion
lodges^ Tbe bulk of these workers continued to live in the
immediate packing neighborhood surrounding the plant. By
the 1930s tbat portion of tbe city was easily among tbe most
poverty-stricken despite low levels of unemployment among its
residents.^
Packing workers were painfully aware of the economic gulf
that separated tbem from the Morrell officials who had long
dominated tbe city's elite. Although the Englisb-based com-
pany established the Ottumwa plant in 1877, tbe number of
English-born executives residing in tbe city accelerated after
1888, when Morrell moved its American headquarters to
Ottumwa. Workers shared a collective sense of disdain for the
life styles and tbe perceived haughtiness of their supervisors,
particularly for tbe Foster family Fosters served as top execu-
tives of the American branch of tbe company until 1953.
Employees commonly referred to the Fosters and many plant
executives as "the rieb Englishmen."^
tory, 1939. Obituary information for a small sample of 34 workers who
worked at Morrell in 1935 indicates that 60 percent had attended a funda-
mentalist Protestant church. I gathered this obituary information on Morrell
workers who died between 1988 and 1991; then I cross-checked their names
in the dty directory to determine those who were employed at the plant in
1935. I am also extrapolating backward from a sample of 116 obituaries
found for Morrell workers who worked at the plant in 1951 and who died
between 1988 and 1991. Sixty {52 percent) of these 116 workers were mem-
bers of fundamentalist Protestant sects.
7. I gleaned this information from my limited obituary samples, based on
city directory information on Morrell workers in 1935 and information
included in obituaries of former employees in the Ottumwa Courier between
1988 and 1991.
8. See the comparative statistical information on Iowa cities included in E L
Thorndike's 144 Smaller Cities {New York, 1940), 106-7, 122. A 1936 report
from the Iowa State Planning Board, "Housing among the Low Income
Groups: Ottumwa," in Iowa Collection, Ottumwa Public Library, provides
considerable insight into the disparities in standards of living within
Ottumwa itself.
9. Lawrence Oakley Cheever, The House of Morrell {Cedar Rapids, 1948), 88.
This collective sense of animosity among Morrell laborers toward the English
"caste" (as one worker termed it) of Morrell managerial personnel is striking
in the oral history testimony I have gathered over the years. For example, see
Ralph Ransom, interview with author, 14 August 1981; Charles Edward
Logan, interview with author, 20 July 1981; Donald Schaub, interview with
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Workers directed strong grievances against the company
by the 1930s. Although due in part to animosities toward the
foreign-born executives living in the city, more crucial were the
strains resulting from the company's labor relations policies
after 1921. In that year Iowa national guard troops intervened
in a violent strike and effectively broke the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen (AFL) local formed in 1918.
Following the strike, Morrell introduced welfare capitalist
measures, providing a thin veneer of managerial reform while
actually allowing for harsher methods of worker control under-
girded by fear and profanity. President Thomas H. Foster and
Plant Superintendent Ernest Manns, though part of the com-
pany's management during the paternalistic era preceding
World War I, both assumed greater power during the plant's
first union period during the war and remained in their respec-
tive managerial positions through World War II. Manns,
described by one worker as a "hard old Englishman and a
horse's ass/ set the tone for the new era of labor relations at the
plant. Under the guise of a foremen's club, he allowed plant
foremen and superintendents greater autonomy to set stan-
dards and production methods in their individual departments.
By the mid-1930s, each plant department was run autono-
mously by the plant's mostly English-born supervisors.'"
THE SOLIDARITY resulting from the shared culture of the
packing community, combined witb the impetus to unioniza-
tion provided by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
infused the union movement that got under way at the Morrell
plant in 1933. Workers initially flocked into a revamped Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen (AFL) Local No.
author, 11 January 1983; Earl F. and Bill Paxson, interview with author, 27
June 1982; and Virgil Bankson, interview with author, 26 September 1982.
The quote comes from Bill Paxson, Earl's son.
10. For descriptions of the successful union-building of the immediate post-
World War I years, see Butcher Workman, March 1919, 5; September 1919, 5;
and April 1921, 5, 12. On the 1921 packing strike in Ottumwa and Morrell's
experiment with welfare capitalism in its Ottumwa plant, see Wilson J. War-
ren, "The Welfare Capitalism of John Morrell and Company," Annals of Iowa
47 (1984), 501-17. The quote is from Paul Bissell, interview with author, 10
January 1983. Bissell was one of the founders of the CIO movement at
Morrell in Ottumwa.
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236, the local that had existed at the plant between 1918 and
1921. Then, in equally large measure, workers rejected that
union by 1935 because of the union president's refusal to sup-
port a strike at Morrell's other large plant in Sioux Falls, South
Dakota. After rejecting help from the Cedar Rapids-based
independent packing union movement in 1935-1936,
Ottumwa's packing workers then turned for organizational
support to the Independent Union of All Workers (IUAW)
based in Austin, Minnesota. They did so primarily because the
IUAW promised that it was organizing for the CIO, the AFL
breakaway organizing committee whose efforts were protected
by the federal government's National Labor Relations (or
Wagner) Act passed in July 1935. After receiving a union char-
ter from the IUAW in April 1937, Morrell's workers then
received a CIO charter in May and petitioned the National
Labor Relations Board for a certification election, When the
election votes were counted, the Packinghouse Workers Orga-
nizing Committee {PWOC) of the CIO had won in a landslide
with two-thirds of the votes. Ottumwa's local received the first
packinghouse charter from the CIO, so later it was designated
LocalNo. 1 of the United Packinghouse Workers of America.^'
11. Butcher Workman, September 1933, 1; Ottumwa Daily Courier, 14 May
1934 and 17 May 1934; Kenneth Ellis and Donald Jones, interview with Paul
Kelso, 20 October 1978, ILHOP; Frances Calhoon, Donald Jones, and Virgil
Bankson, interview with Leslie F Orear, 14 January 1974, Local P-1, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO
Records, SHSI; Paul Bissell, interview with author, 25 November 1984; Art
Bankson, interviews with author, 17 May 1983 and 25 Novemher 1984; Virgil
Bankson, interview with Paul Kelso, 1978, ILHOP; Virgil Bankson, interview
with author, 26 September 1982; Minutes of Regular Meetings of 21 April, 3,
17June, 2 September, 7 October 1936, and 6 January 1937, Mid-west Union
of All Packing House Workers (MUAPW), 1936-37 Minute Book, UPWA
Local P-3 Records, SHSI; "History of Local No. 32 of Ottumwa, Iowa," CIO
Convention Program, p. 15, UPWA Local P-3 Records; The Unionist (official
newspaper of the IUAW), 30 April 1937, in "Scrapbook," UPWA Local P 3
Records; and Des Moines Register, 16 May 1937. Although obviously not a
unanimous victory, I describe the PWOC's success in Ottumwa's certification
election as a "landslide" primarily in the context of the rather narrow victories
won by nearly all of the PWOC locals in places such as Omaha, Topeka, and
other cities in the Midwest during the late 1930s and early 1940s. For
instance. Armour's local in Omaha won with 51 percent. Swift's local in
Omaha won with 55 percent, and Morrell's local in Topeka won, after two
unsuccessful attempts, with 56 percent.
370 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
The enthusiasm of the union-building period at Morrell
flowed from the close-knit and culturally uniform character of
the packing community. Before the certification election in
October 1937, about 60 percent of Morrell's employees, and 34
of the 70 members of the union grievance committee, lived in
the immediate packing neighborhood. The boundaries of this
neighborhood corresponded neatly with Ottumwa's Ward
One. Another 19 members of the grievance committee lived in
Ward Five, immediately adjacent to Ward One. Clearly, workers
elected departmental leaders who shared a neighborhood with
them as well as worked with them. Union meetings regularly
included exhortations from packing neighborhood fundamen-
talist Protestant ministers, some of whom worked in the plant.'^
Between 1938 and 1945, Local No. 1 effectively channeled
its members' cultural and union solidarity into two types of
political action with two objectives. Through collective bargain-
ing and informal job actions, workers hoped to create a more
democratic work environment. They also used both types of
political action to elevate the status of the packing community
in the city as a whole.
Workers' efforts to secure a written collective bargaining
agreement commenced shortly after the union had been certi-
fied. From January to March 1938, the union threatened
repeatedly to strike if the company did not sign a contract
including provisions for a closed shop and dues checkoff.
Although those demands remained unmet, Morrell legitimized
the union by signing a contract with it on March 22,1938. Then
in 1939, the local went out on strike. The union did not win
12. My assessment of the residences of Ottumwa's packing workere is based
on a random sample of 127 names from the 1935 McCoy's Ottumwa City
Directory. On the early union-building period, see "History of Local No. 32,"
15; Art Bankson, interview, 25 November 1984; Paul Bissell, interview, 25
November 1984; Elmer Cline, interview with Merle Davis, 25 September
1981, ILHOP; Regular Meeting of MUAFW, 21 July 1937, 1936-37 Minute
Book, UPWA Local P-3 Records; McCoy's Ottumwa City Directory, 1937; The
Unionist, 23 July 1937, UPWA Local P 3 Records; and The Organizer, 14, 28
June, 5, 19 July 1937. Insight into the un ion-building movement in 1937 at
the Morrell plant in Ottumwa can also be gleaned from the virtually com-
plete holdings of The Organizer, the plant's union paper in that year, included
in the UPWA Local P-3 Records. See also David Brody, The Butcher Workmen:
A Study of Unionization (Cambridge, MA, 1964), 167-68.
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much in actual contractual gains, but Morrell did agree to retain
all union members. The company did not grant workers the
union shop and dues checkoff until the National War Labor
Board pressured the company to sign a master agreement with
its ClO-organized plants in Ottumwa and Topeka in 1943. In
that year, the PWOC received its international union charter
from the CIO and became the United Packinghouse Workers of
America (UPWA).^ ^
Ottumwa's packing workers were much more successful
between 1938 and the end of World War II in securing informal
agreements involving production standards. In this respect,
Morreil's policy of allowing supervisors to "rule" their depart-
ments autonomously played directly into the hands of the
union. By directing their solidarity into militant job actions,
workers in the two key plant departments, the pork and beef
kill and cut, were able to pressure supervisors into new agree-
ments about the pace of the work. These informal arrange-
ments lasted through the end of World War 11.^ ^
Virgil Bankson recalled one of the most important of those
job actions. Clarence "Bronc" Poney, one of the floorsmen
(skinners) in the beef kill, initiated a sit-down strike in the
department. Poney hoped to assert the beef kill workers' power
to control the speed of the chain used to regulate how many
cattle were killed per hour. Bankson indicated that before the
certification of the PWOC local, the company had always
13. 1 obtained information on the 1938 and 1939 labor disputes primarily
from the Otfumwa Daily Courier, especially 19, 20, 22, 25 January, 22 March
1938, 24-30 August 1939. Parts of the UPWA Collection at the State Historical
Sodety of Wisconsin (SHSW), Madison, also deal with the Ottumwa strikes
and various contracts signed between 1938 and 1943. See "Agreement, dated
21 March 1938" and "Agreement of John Morrell and Co. and the
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, Locals No. 1 and 174," 3 April
1943, box 192, folder 2, UPWA Records. In addition, oral history testimony
provides insight into the nature of the controversies in these years. See, for
example. Art Bankson, interview with author, 17 May 1983; Virgil Bankson,
interview with Paul Kelso; Virgil Bankson, interview with author; Virgil
Bankson, interview with Merle Davis, 11 March 1983, ILHOP; Frances
Calhoon, Donald Jones, and Virgil Bankson, interviews with Leslie Orear; Tom
Cohagan, interview with Paul Kelso, 18 October 1978, ILHOP; Kenneth Ellis
and Donald Jones, interview with Paul Kelso, 20 October 1978, ILHOP; and
Harold Poney and Albert Lewis, interviews with author, 8 December 1984.
14. See especially the oral histories cited in n. 13.
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established the rate. Furthermore, the rate might vary from one
day to another. Morrell had generally encouraged a fast pace by
paying a "lead-off floorsman a couple of cents more per hour
than the others. Poney announced one day that this practice
would continue no longer, and the rest of the men in the
department followed suit. The foremen, especially Leo
O'Malley, ridiculed Poney to keep him moving, but the men
refused to budge. Finally, the beef department superintendent.
Art Woodman, agreed to talk to Poney after work. When Poney
brought the whole gang to the meeting. Woodman agreed
informally to allow a rate of sixteen beef per floorsman. That
pace would remain the accepted standard until after World
War 11.^ 5
While increasing its power in the plant. Local No. 1 aggres-
sively expanded its presence in city politics. Part of this expan-
sion occurred when Local No. 1 created the Ottumwa Industrial
Union Council (OIUC) in 1939. Local No. 1 members domi-
nated this CIO citywide labor body. Although the competing
AFL central labor body, the Trades and Labor Assembly, was
older and represented more unions, the OIUC soon overshad-
owed it. The OIUC spurred the establishment of the CIO union
in the city's John Deere plant and led attempts to form CIO
unions in traditionally AFL sectors, such as the city's truck driv-
ers in 1941. Beginning in 1940, Local No. 1 also regularly began
to run candidates for city offices. In the 1940 school board elec-
tion, the union tried to place a former Local No. 1 president on
the board. Although it was not successful, the effort did strike
fear in the city's business and professional community when
union member Charles Sears ran neck and neck with Ernest
Manns, who had been a member of the board for twenty
years.'^
Local No. l's greatest political victory came during the war
years, however. Twice, in 1941 and 1944, the union led coali-
15. Virgil Bankson, interviews; and Harold Poney, interview. Harold is a
younger brother of Clarence.
16. On the school board election, see Ottumwa Daily Courier, 28 February, 1,
3,12 March 1940. On the struggle between the AFL and CIO to organize the
city's truck drivers, see Ottumwa Daily Courier, 2-22 September 1941; and
Minutes of Regular MeeHng of LocaflMo. 3, 17 September 1941, 1939-42
Minute Book, UPWA Local P-3 Records.
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tions of working-class voters in defeating proposals to institute
a city-manager form of government. Beginning in early 1941,
the Citizens Committee for the Council-Manager Plan pro-
posed that Ottumwa hire a salaried city manager to "administer
the city's business." The city council would then become an
unpaid body of public servants. Morrell executives played a
leading role in attempting to replace the city's commission sys-
tem with this new form of government. The advocates of the
city-manager plan baldly stated that labor's influence made it
impossible to "ELECT and KEEP men of ABILITY in office." The
plan's opponents, led by the OIUC, argued that it was a blatant
attempt to remove working people from local political affairs.
Using language that purposely evoked strong class sentiments
in laboring people still struggling for gains in the workplace,
opponents asserted that the city-manager plan would mean
'ONE-MAN AUTHORITY" and would deprive citizens of "political
and personal liberty." Ottumwa's residents, they continued,
were being asked to "adopt the dictator plan and have a
stranger rule us!" In the union's first political success in the city,
the plan failed by a margin of more than two-to-one in the city
as a whole and by much wider margins in the working-class
precincts. In 1944, after racketeering charges resulted in the dis-
missal of the city's safety commissioner and nearly ended the
mayor's reign, the business and professional community, this
time more overtly led by the Foster family, again attempted to
secure passage of the city-manager plan. But again, they failed.
This time, the vote was just short of a two-to-one margin.'^
As the packing community's power grew during the war,
both Morrell's management and much of Ottumwa's business
and professional community organized a counteroffensive. The
first and most direct challenge came when Morrell reasserted
managerial authority in the plant. Between 1942 and 1947,
Morrell introduced a more systematic and centralized approach
to its production efforts. A new industrial engineering depart-
ment initiated time studies, and, immediately after the war, a
restructuring of administrative hierarchies gave the plant
superintendent greater authority in production decisions. Not
coincidentally, many older supervisors, including Ernest
17. See Ottumwa Daily Courier, 7-19 March 1941; and 8 Aprll-21 June 1944.
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Manns, who had been terrors of their departments before the
war, retired or were fired during this postwar period.^ ^
In 1946 Local No. 1 participated in the UPWA's nationwide
strike. The strike was cast locally into the evolving power strug-
gle between the packing community and Morrell. The strike
also gave Morrell an opportunity to build alliances with
Ottumwa's residents. After ten days of peaceful picketing fol-
lowing the UPWA's strike announcement on January 16, Presi-
dent Harry Truman authorized the government to seize the
nation's packing plants. George M. Foster, Morrell's president,
solemnly announced on the front page of the Ottumwa Daily
Courier that he would run the plant on the government's
behalf. The implicit but obvious message was that the company
was acting patriotically while the union was not. Still, this bad
local press did not dampen the local's sense of triumph. When
Local No. 1 voted to return to work three days later, workers
received a sixteen-cent-per-hour wage hike, like all UPWA and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen {AFL) locals
nationwide.'^
The strike bolstered the union's confidence and further
hardened the company's resolve to block any additional union
gains. Morrell continued to restructure its management. In the
spring of 1947 Charles L. Campbell was appointed to the now
crucial position of plant superintendent. A long and diligent
student of the "drive" method of supervision, Campbell had
18. Morrell Magazine, March 1944, 8; August 1946, 3; and September-
October 1946, 9; Harold Poney, interview; Gilbert Baker, interview with
author, 4 August 1982; and John (Jack) Moses, interview with author, 12 Sep-
tember 1982. Both Baker and Moses worked in the Industrial engineering
department during these years and were involved in the company's more
"scientific" approach to production decisions.
19. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 12,15,16,18,19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28 January 1946.
On the larger context and implications of the 1946 strike for the CIO, see Nel-
son Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining; Organized
Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era," in The Rise
and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle
{Princeton, 1989), 122-33. On the meaning and implications of the 1946
strike for the UPWA, see Brody, The Butcher Workmen, 229-32; and Roger
Horowitz, "'It is Harder to Struggle than to Surrender': The Rank and File
Unionism of the United Packinghouse Workers of America, 1933-1948,"
Studies in History and Politics 5 (1986), 89-90.
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previously held plant superintendent positions in Armour
plants in Chicago, St. Joseph, and Kansas City.^ '*
From the early 1940s until 1950, Morrell also expanded
production at the Ottumwa plant. This expansion was most
rapid from 1945 to 1949, when the number of production
workers increased from 2,350 to 3,430. By 1950, the Morrell
plant provided almost two-thirds of all the manufacturing jobs
in Ottumwa. Significantly, many of the new workers came from
outside the city. Whereas in 1935 almost none of the plant's
workers resided outside the city, by 1951 about 27 percent of
the plant's work force lived in small towns or farms as far away
as fifty miles.^ ^
UPWA officials were convinced that packers located in
rural areas were hiring such people because they would
presumably be less interested in union participation. Thus,
beginning in 1944, the UPWA extended its political support
for Democratic candidates into rural areas. In 1946 they added
farmer-labor relations to their list of major programs. The
UPWA encouraged locals situated in rural areas to establish
their own farmer-labor committees and conduct meetings
focusing on issues of concern to rural residents, farmers, and
city laborers. Ottumwa formed one of the first such local union
committees during the spring of 1947 following the UPWA's
successful arbitration of a milk producers' strike in the city. In
1947 and early 1948 Local No. 1 aggressively pursued farmer-
labor cooperative efforts in the hope of winning rural support
for their overall agenda.^^
20. Morrell Magazine, May 1947, 5.
21. Packinghouse Worker (UPWA's official newspaper), 14 December 1945, 3;
John Morrell and Co. Executive Department Announcement, 16 April 1949, box
411, folder 7, UPWA Records; Seveîiteenth Census of the United States, 1950, vol.
2, Population. The calculation of rural residents employed by Morrell in 1951 is
based on my systematic sampling of plant employees from the Polk's Ottumwa
City Directory for that year. Although not perfect, in lieu of employee records,
city directories provide substantial insight into workers' residences since their
criteria for indusion are based on who works in the city as well as who lives
there. The city directories indicate the city where the employee lived, so it is pos-
sible to calculate the distance traveled to work. Some workers commuted from
Kirksville, Missouri, about fifty miles south of Ottumwa.
22. The Packinghouse Worker consistently noted the UPWA's farmer-labor
political activities after the mid-1940s. See especially Packinghouse Worker, 30
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THE UPWA'S NATIONWIDE STRIKE in 1948 severely
tested the solidarity Local No. 1 had built in the face of steady
managerial "counterorganizing" efforts during the previous six
years. This crucial struggle for power in the plant spilled over
into a fierce battle for public support in the rest of the city.
Much of the propaganda war was waged in the pages of the
Ottumwa Daily Courier.
The packing community demonstrated its solidarity during
the early days of the strike by maintaining a picket line six and
one-half miles long around the plant. Public officials, fearing
that the strikers might become violent, began to plan how to
combat them. A few days after the strike began in early March,
officials closed all the taverns in the packing neighborhood, cit-
ing instances of public drunkenness among strikers. On April 5,
Local No. 1 issued a bulletin claiming that Ottumwa Safety
Commissioner Charles Carlson was considering the use of fire
hoses on picketers since they "would be better than using gun
butts." Carlson denied the statement, but quickly added that
fire hoses would be used only if a riot broke out.^ ^
Because of the unity strikers exhibited in March, Morrell
officials decided in early April to test the union's strength by
shipping meat out of the plant. Morrell knew that strikers
would interpret such an attempt as an initiation of business
activity proscribed during strikes by prior agreements. Jim
Collins, a foreman who worked in the plant during the strike,
later described the company's plan as "an attempt to break the
March 1945, 4-5; and December 1952, 2. Also see "UPWA Program for
Building Toward Farmer-Labor Unity," 9 April 1947, box 490, folder 10,
UPWA Records. This document offers the union's rationale for initiating the
program, reviews its efforts to date, and gives a preliminary assessment of
the success of the program. For a sample of the UPWA's evaluation of Local
No, l's farmer-labor efforts, see "A Roundup of What is Happening in
Farmer-Labor Relations," c. August 1947, box 298, folder 11, UPWA Records.
For more information on the general context of the CIO's farmer-labor politi-
cal activities in the period (for example, the Farm Equipment Workers were
even more active in this field than the UPWA), see Wilson J. Warren, "The
'People's Century' in Iowa: Coalition-Building among Farm and Labor Orga-
nizations, 1945-1950," Annals of Iowa 49 (1988), 376-78.
23. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 15, 19, 31 March, 1, 2, 5 April 1948. On the
national dimensions of the 1948 UPWA packing strike, see Brody, Butcher
Workmen, 232-40; and Roger Horowitz, "'It is Harder to Struggle than to Sur-
render,'" 90-93.
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Picketers hiiihi a hairicadc lo prevent the movement of a freight car
stopped the previous day. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 7 April 1948.
union by shipping meat out." When Morrell officials attempted
to move five railcars loaded with meat out of the plant on April
7 and 8, massed picketers successfully blocked the cars from
leaving. On April 9, however, Iowa District Court judge Harold
V. Levis issued a temporary injunction that thoroughly under-
cut the massed unity the strikers had demonstrated. The
injunction stipulated that just five people could picket at each
picket station (instead of the dozens who had done so previ-
ously), and that strikers could not barricade plant entrances and
exits or impede employees entering or leaving the plant. In
addition, the injunction named 220 union activists who could
be charged with contempt if any of the injunction's restraints
on picketing the plant were violated.^ "*
Apart from painting the words SCAB MEAT on the side of
some of the railcars involved in the attempt to move meat out of
the plant, Ottumwa's packing community had not engaged in
any violence before April 9. The injunction changed the strik-
ers' tactics, however. Because of this legal restraint. Local No. 1
24. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 6-10 April 1948; Collins, interview with author,
12 August 1981.
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¡¡ jj / ^ prevent strikers from
interfering with the movement of freight cars. Ottumwa Daily
Courier, 10 April 1948.
embarked on a type of "guerrilla warfare" to forcibly dissuade
foremen and other supervisors, the only employees the com-
pany could persuade to process meat, from carrying on such
activities. Strikers either verbally or physically assaulted mana-
gerial personnel involved in production during the strike. Typi-
cally, strikers would follow foremen and supervisors when they
left the plant, and attack them at or near their homes. Virgil
Bankson later explained that such "violence was necessary"
from the union's perspective; union leaders now felt that they
were involved in a life-and-death struggle to save their union.
From their perspective, it was the company that had violated
earlier agreements by attempting to initiate business activities
during the strike. Under the restraint of the injunction, union
leaders could not bring the strength of the packing communi-
ty's solidarity to bear against the company. They therefore con-
doned a type of "directed" violence in the hope of maintaining
their strike effort. This type of violence differed from the ran-
dom violence that broke out in other midwestern packing cen-
ters during the 1948 strike. In Omaha, for instance, union lead-
ers made little concerted effort to have strikers strategically
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direct their violence. Instead, union members committed ran-
dom acts of violence that four major UPWA local unions and
their leaders could not controL^^
Morrell quickly responded to this guerrilla warfare by tar-
geting for prosecution Local No. 1 leaders who had participated
in such violence. On April 15, Donald Jones, Local No. l's pres-
ident in 1947, was arrested for contempt of the injunction.
Jones had allegedly participated in an attack on three foremen.
During the following week, four rank-and-file members were
arrested on similar charges, but Morrell pressed charges only
against Jones. Iowa District Judge Harold V. Levis heard evi-
dence in the Jones contempt case from April 21 to 27. In the
meantime, Levis added an additional 255 strikers' names to the
injunction. While the Jones case was under way, the Ottumwa
Daily Courier left no doubt about its stand on the actions of
Jones and fellow strikers. "Evidence is multiplying that lawless
goon squads are patrolling the city streets and neighboring
highways to terrorize persons connected with John Morrell and
Co." Morrell officials, as well as growing segments of the busi-
ness and professional community, were now adamant that the
union's ranks were filled with thugs who condoned criminal
activity. The union's opponents charged that its workers were
not only lawbreakers; they were lazy as well. President George
M. Foster publicly proclaimed, "Our experience with the
Ottumwa local has been bad. Within the past five years
[roughly coinciding with the beginning of the new managerial
policies] there have been 42 work stoppages, slowdowns, or
strikes resulting in 67 days
25. Virgil Bankson, interview with Paul Kelso. In comparing the use of vio-
lence by strikers during the 1948 UPWA strike, my remarks are based primar-
ily on a systematic comparison of the 1948 strikes in Ottumwa, St. Joseph,
Topeka, and Omaha, detailed in my forthcoming dissertation. On the 1948
strike in Omaha, see also William Pratt, "Workers, Bosses, and Public Offi-
cials: Omaha's 1948 Packinghouse Strike," Nebraska History 66 (1985), 294-
313. More specifically, my assessment of the use of violence by strikers in
Omaha is based on UPWA local union records included in the UPWA
Records, State Historical Sodety of Wisconsin, Madison; Omaha newspa-
pers, especially the Morning World-Herald; and the interviews with Omaha
union members included in the UPWA Oral History Project, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin.
26. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23 April 1948,
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In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the packing com-
munity's perspective on the strike and its conduct was increas-
ingly isolated. Ottumwa's packing workers were by no means
alone in this respect. Nationally, organized labor's power and
prestige were in retreat by 1948, particularly following the pas-
sage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Although historians have
since downplayed the effect of the act's restrictions on labor,
there is little doubt that both the AFL and CIO then saw it as a
blow to their strength.^''
Locally, the isolation of the packing community was
reflected in Judge Levis's decision against Donald Jones. Two
other strikers present at the altercation, Jim Hammersley and
Bernard Jones, Donald's brother, testified that Donald Jones
was not involved in the fight. In fact, both men attested that
they verbally confronted one of the foremen, Claude Smith,
after he got out of a car that had stopped at the home of another
Morrell supervisory employee. Smith then struck Bernard Jones
with a flashlight. Smith's assault only prompted both men to
attack Smith. Of the nine other foremen present at the scene,
only one corroborated Smith's claim that Donald Jones was
involved in the fight. Yet on April 28, Judge Levis found Jones
guilty of contempt and ordered him to serve sixty days in the
county jail. Levis's reasoning in his decision is particularly
revealing.
The circumstances surrounding the whole affair lead to the con-
clusion that the mission of the occupants of the two cars which
followed the Morrell car for a distance of four or five miles across
the city was not a peaceable one, but rather, it appears that the
occupants of the two cars were acting in concert to follow the
Morrell car until it stopped for the purpose of using coercion,
intimidation and force upon its occupants,
Levis continued that the union men "must have rushed almost
en masse to the door of the Morrell car" (emphasis added). The
resulting confusion would account for the contradictions in the
27. One of the most respected scholarly assessments of the Taft-Hartley Act
can be found in Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: labor Rela-
tions, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, Í880-1960
(Cambridge, 1985), 247-316.
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foremen's testimony about Jones's participation in the fight.
Jones himself repeatedly insisted in interviews conducted over
the following twenty-five years that he had not participated in
the fight. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Jones's
conviction on April 11, 1949, but reduced his sentence to thirty
days. The message was clear: public order as interpreted by the
company and state and local officials must prevail despite the
packing community's perception that their avenues of accept-
able action had been undercut by the injunction.^^
After the beginning of May, the company had greater suc-
cess in attracting replacement workers. In a list compiled in
1950 to prevent their employment at the plant, Local No. l's
records showed that just seventy-two active union members
crossed the picket lines, while an additional 139 nonunion
members worked in the plant before the strike ended. To be
sure, the number of scabs was small. Still, the backgrounds of
the replacement workers provide some insight into the sources
of dissension growing within the local union. Based on infor-
mation on the addresses of sixty-two union members who
crossed the picket lines, the largest segment (37 percent) lived at
rural route addresses or in small farming towns. In comparison,
although it was still home to by far the largest number of plant
workers, the immediate packing neighborhood surrounding the
plant contributed only 16 percent of the scabs.^ ^
The only other significant difference between the urban
and rural workers was that the rural component did not partici-
pate to nearly the same extent in the four largest social organi-
zations for working people in the city: the Eagles, Moose,
American Legion, and Veterans of Foreign Wars.^" As had
28. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 27, 28 April, 8 May 1948; Kenneth Ellis and
Donald Jones, interviews with Paul Kelso; Frances Calhoon, Donald Jones,
and Virgil Bankson, interviews with Leslie Orear; and Edward Filliman,
UPWA field representative. Weekly Report, 12 February and 16 April 1949,
box 411, folder 7, UPWA Records.
29. "Addresses of Union Scabs in 1948," box 23, folder 2, Local P-1 Records,
SHSI.
30. This observation is based on a work force profile developed for Morrell
workers who were employed at the plant in 1951. Using information
included in obituaries in the Ottumwa Courier between 1988 and 1991, sup-
plemented by information on these workers provided by the 1951 Polk's
Ottumwa City Directory, 1 developed profiles for 116 deceased Morrell work-
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already been the case in the 1930s, the packing community sit-
uated in the immediate plant environs provided considerable
membership in the fraternal organizations that catered to
working people in Ottumwa. (The VFW drew significant num-
bers only after World War II.) Although the content or pro-
grams of these fraternals was not overtly political, they func-
tioned as part of the packing community's range of social ties,
both formal and informal, that contributed to its solidarity. The
importance of Morrell workers in these fraternals was evident
during the 1948 strike when the American Legion post's mem-
bership voted to donate $1,500 to Local No. l's strike fund.
Even though a slightly higher percentage of the rural
component's males were veterans of World War II, few of them
were willing or able to travel to Ottumwa to belong to the local
American Legion or VFW posts. Morrell workers apparently
hoped to tap the American Legion as an additional source of
financial aid. However, the executive board of the post, which
was dominated by business and professional allies of the com-
pany, turned down the membership's request.- '^
Whereas the urban component of Morrell's work force was
knit closely not only by membership in Local No. 1 but also by
a wider circle of social affiliations, this broader social participa-
tion was largely absent from the rural components of the work
force. Thus, while Local No. l's leaders had attempted to edu-
cate and incorporate the fanners and working-class rural resi-
ers who had worked in the plant in 1951. Whereas 31 (27 percent) lived at
rural or small-town addresses in that year, the other 85 (73 percent) lived In
Ottumwa. Typically, the Courier's obituaries provide consistent and detailed
information about workers' ages, marital status, veteran status, and religious
affiliations as well as lists of their memberships in various social organiza-
tions. In terms of birthplaces, 72 percent of the urban component had been
born in either Wapello County or adjacent counties versus 87 percent for the
rural component. Regarding marital status, 86 percent of the urban propor-
tion were married, while 81 percent of the rural workers were married. The
largest segments of both groups were members of fundamentalist Protestant
sects (54 percent for the urban, 45 percent for the rural), and almost one half
of both groups' males were veterans of World War II (43 percent for the
urban, 48 percent for the rural). These small differences contrast with those
marking the difference between the two groups on other social memberships:
54 percent of the urban workers belonged to one or more social organizations
compared to only 29 percent of the rural workers.
31. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 12, 26 May 1948.
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dents of the area into its culture of solidarity before 1948, these
people were not enmeshed in the broader network of social
relations that undergirded this culture. Accordingly, they were
not sensitive to the traditions and concerns that had prompted
the packing community's successful union-building. These
attributes help to explain the greater propensity of rural work-
ers to cross the picket line during the strike."
On May 27, Local No. 1 voted to end its participation in the
UPWA's strike and settled according to terms set by the com-
pany. The 1948 strike was a key turning point in the evolution
of the packing community's political solidarity in Ottumwa.
Although superficially the local emerged from the strike intact,
the packing community would now be on the defensive. Its sol-
idarity was increasingly disrupted not only by even more
aggressive company strategies in dealing with the union, but by
the company's continued employment of rural workers. Morrell
also learned to count on support for its positions from
Ottumwa's business and professional community after the
1948 strike. Morrell had successfully raised the specter of per-
sistent meat famines and continuing declines in the city's retail
business if such strikes occurred again. Such threats carried
considerable weight in Ottumwa, since 75 percent of the meat
sold there in 1945 came from the Morrell plant, and retail busi-
ness declined by 50 percent in the town during the two-month
strike in 1948.33
32. The obituary data suggest that a large number of the rural workers who
were increasingly employed by Morrell at this time had had some farming
experience. Although the available literature on the impact of the growing
influx of fanners and part-time farmers into Iowa factories in the immediate
postwar period is slight, there have been a few studies on the characteristics
of Iowa farmers who quit farming in the decade of the 1950s and who found
urban employment. See, for example, Jeffrey Allan Robinson, "Perceptions
and Experiences of Young Iowa Farm Families who Changed Residence and
Occupation" (M.S. thesis, Iowa State University, 1962); and William Marion
Edwards, "Occupational Adjustment among Iowa Farm Operators" (M.S.
thesis, Iowa State University, 1971), Typically, such "quit' farmers were likely
to be tenant farmers. According to Robinson (p. 24), between 1940 and 1959
the number of tenant farmers in Iowa dropped by forty thousand.
33. In assessing the aftermath of the 1948 strike for the UPWA, David Brody,
The Butcher Workmen, 235, says, "The central fact was that the crushing defeat
and internal breakdown did not destroy the UPWA; recovery was quick and
convincing." In Ottumwa's case, however. Local No, 1 s postwar experiences
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MORRELL'S STRATEGY in fighting the union in the plant
from 1949 to 1951 involved a persistent refusal to recognize
Local No. l's right to contest production decisions made by the
company. Specifically, Morrell introduced "job load" changes;
that is, the company decreased the number of workers in vari-
ous departments while increasing the pace of production.
These changes were established in the wake of time studies
undertaken by the company's industrial engineering depart-
ment and were enforced by Plant Superintendent "Mad Dog" or
'Do It or Else" Campbell (as the union now referred to him).
The changes occurred primarily in the union strongholds of the
beef and hog departments, where they undermined the infor-
mal production arrangements the union had established before
the end of World War IL Between 1949 and 1951, Morrell
repeatedly refused to bargain with either Local No. 1 or inter-
national representatives of the UPWA on the issue of produc-
tion decisions related to job loads. When the local called strikes,
walked out, or stopped work over company refusals to listen to
their side, the company not only suspended hundreds of work-
ers but regularly used the pages of the Ottumwa Daily Courier to
publicize the union's alleged refusal to perform "a fair day's
work for a fair day's pay."^ ^
In the face of the company's increased resolve after the
1948 strike to disrupt collective bargaining and reshape com-
belie his statement. The statistic on the contribution of local Morrell meats to
Ottumwa's retail market is from Ottumwa Daily Courier, 6 April 1945; that for
the decline in retail business is from ibid., 4 May 1948. On the negotiations
between labor and management leading up to the decision of Local No. 1 to
return to work, see Ottumwa Daily Courier, 5, 7, 10, 14, 22, 28 May 1948.
34. The sources for the contest between the union and Morrell between 1949
and 1951 over production-related issues include Morrell Magazine, National
Provisioner (the meatpacking industry's periodical), and Ottumwa Daily Cou-
rier, all of which were "mouthpieces" for the company's side, and, for the
union. The Bulletin (Local No. l's official paper). Packinghouse Worker, and
Edward Filliman's weekly reports to the UPWA international office. See
especially Morreli Magazine, December 1948, February 1949, and April 1952;
National Provisioner, 17 December 1949; Ottumwa Daily Courier, 23 February,
1 May 1949, 24, 26 March 1951; The Bulletin, 15 April, 2,16 May, 6, 20 June,
13, 18, 25 July, 15 August, 19 September 1949, box 411, folder 7, and box
441, UPWA Records; and Packinghouse Worker, 1 October 1948 and 9 Septem-
ber 1949. A nearly complete set of Edward Filliman's UPWA field representa-
tive reports from 1949 to 1951 are included in box 411, folder 7 (1949 reports)
and box 415, folder 13 (1950-51 reports), UPWA Records.
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munity attitudes, the local attempted over the course of the
next three years to recapture its prestrike aggressiveness in
combating the company. The union adopted a concerted policy
of attacking Morrell as an enemy of all working people in
Ottumwa. Noting that after the speed-ups in 1949, seventy-
five workers produced as much as one hundred workers had
ten years earlier. The Bulletin, Local No. l's weekly paper, pro-
claimed, "John Morrell and Company will ruin your health and
drive you to your grave 15 years ahead of time. John Morrell
and Company is our common enemy. Let's concentrate on an
all-out effort to defeating [sic] them." Morrell responded to such
attacks in what was now their typical post-World War II style:
they took out a newspaper advertisement. In reply to the
union's outburst, the company rhetorically asked Local No. 1 in
a quarter-page advertisement to explain what it meant when it
said that it wanted to "defeat" the company. "Where will you
workers go if the company is put out of business?" Local No. 1
noted in its own (smaller) ad that, as usual, the company's
remarks were meant for public consumption and confused the
issues. Although Morrell had praised Local No. 1 for their
"magnificent job" during the war, now, even though overall
production had increased, workers were told that the company
expected a fair day's work for a fair day's pay! "If the company
was fair minded and believed in humanity, they would sit down
and work out some fair agreement [involving job loads]."^^
Although initially aggressive on these issues, by 1951 a
combination of financial turmoil, weakening resolve by the
local union's leadership, and decreasing support from the inter-
national union's leadership combined to sap Local No. l's abil-
ity to contest the company on production-related issues.
Edward Filliman, the UPWA international representative
assigned to the plant, and a former union leader there during
the local's heyday, noted in 1951 that the company continued
to hire new workers from outside the city. Those new workers
presumably replaced workers who had participated in the
35. The Bulletin, 15 April 1949, box 411, folder 7, UPWA Records; John
Morrell and Co., Executive Department Announcement, 16 April 1949, box
411, folder 7, UPWA Records; newspaper clippings in box 441, folder 7,
UPWA Records; and The Bulletin, 2 May 1949, box 441, UPWA Records.
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union-building ten to fifteen years before. Thus Filliman found
that he had to reeducate the local about the need for solidarity.
Moreover, between 1949 and 1951, when Local No. l's farmer-
labor relations program could have helped immensely, it nearly
disintegrated. Filliman also chastised the international union
leaders for not supporting the local's fight, which resulted in
eighty-eight separate walkouts at the plant in 1951 alone.
You may say [that continued walkouts are] not justified, but I say
the men were right. I helped break down this kind of [arbitrary
work] assignment and condition years ago. [This] was one of the
big deals when we organized our union[.] [T]his is a fighting
deal, this old company method of do as your [sit:] told was one of
the things that brought on unionism.... [We] have to fight to
keep from going back to those days again.^ ^
After 1948, Local No. l's political power in the city also
eroded considerably. Early in 1949, Local No. 1, operating in
concert with the Ottumwa Industrial Union Council and the
AFL's Ottumwa Trades and Labor Assembly, formed the
Ottumwa Policy Committee to unite the city's working class for
the approaching city elections. Local No. 1 hoped to punish
officials who had taken the company's side in the 1948 strike as
well as to reestablish their political prestige in the city. Three
candidates supported by the Ottumwa Policy Committee made
36. Edward Filliman, weekly field reports, September 1951; see also 6 Janu-
ary, 21 April, 18 August 1951, box 415, folder 13, UPWA Records. The statis-
tic on work stoppages in 1951 is from National Provisioner, 1 May 1954. Part
of the reason for the decline of Local No. l's farmer-labor program was the
dissolution of the UPWA's overall farmer-labor relations program following
the death of its first national director. Lee Simon. Between 1949 and 1952,
the UPWA continued to sponsor booths at county fairs throughout the Mid-
west, but these efforts were seen even with the UPWA as inadequate means
of addressing the need to sway "anti-labor" farmers and rural residents who
worked in packing to the union's side. See especially "UPWA Farmer-Labor
Program: Present Position and Future Prospects," 4 October 1948, box 50,
folder 9, UPWA Records; Russell Bull (UPWA District No. 3 assistant director)
to UPWA Local Unions Nos. 1, 3, 31, 38, 46, 79, and 89, 29 October 1948, box
490, folder 11, UPWA Records. By late 1952, Clive Knowles, UPWA farmer-
labor director, acknowledged that the UPWA's farmer-labor relations pro-
gram had reached a "standstill." Knowles to Russell Lasley, UPWA vice-
president, 24 November 1952, box 488, folder 6, UPWA Records. See also
Warren, "The 'People's Century' in Iowa," 387.
The Heyday of the CIO 387
it onto the general election ballot. Before the general elections.
Local No. 1 reminded its members to "recall just what position
certain members of the City Council took in regards to the
strike action at Morrells last year." Yet just before the election,
the Ottumwa Policy Committee's alliance between AFL and
CIO unions disintegrated. The Ottumwa Trades and Labor
Assembly told its AFL members to support the three candidates
running in opposition to those that Local No. 1 and the
Ottumwa Industrial Union Council were supporting. One of
the candidates supported by the AFL was Herschel Loveless, a
future Democratic governor of Iowa. In the largest voter turn-
out for city elections in Ottumwa's history, only one of the can-
didates supported by Local No. 1 emerged victorious.^^
Then, in the 1951 and 1953 city elections, none of Local
No. l's candidates who ran for office even received enough
votes in the primaries to make it onto the general election ballot.
Indeed, in those years, the packing community did not give
undivided support to its own people. This may have been
because the candidates were local union officials embroiled in
financial problems that disrupted the local during the early
1950s. Undoubtedly exasperated over the multitude of prob-
lems the local was experiencing, Edward Filliman noted in one
of his weekly reports in 1951 that too many of Local No. l's
officers were "Do-Nothing, Money-Grabbing individuals." In
addition, just one of the dozen Local No. l's executive board
members in 1951 had taken a leading role in the union-building
that had occurred in the 1930s and early 1940s.^ ^
The final blow to the packing community's political power
in Ottumwa fell in 1953 when the council-manager plan of city
government finally replaced the commission form. Defeat of
the plan had been one of the local's greatest triumphs in 1941
and 1944. Yet in 1953, after Local No. l's executive board
refused to allocate more than a paltry sum to fight it, it passed
37. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 12, 23 February, 14, 16, 28, 29 March 1949; The
Bulletin, 24, 28 March 1949, box 441, UPWA Records.
38. On the 1951 and 1953 city elections, see Ottumwa Daily Courier, 14, 27
March 1951, 21 October, 4 November 1953. Filliman's quote is from his
UPWA weekly report, 10 February 1951, box 415, folder 13, UPWA Records.
On the turnover in Local No. l's executive board by 1951, see Local No. 1
Officer Ust, 8 February 1951, box 314, folder 2, UPWA Records.
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by a 58 percent plurality. Only in the precinct including the
immediate packing neighborhood was the plan defeated;
Morrell workers in precincts outside the old packing neighbor-
hood contributed to its passage. Furthermore, not one CIO
member in the city was able to win a seat on the new city coun-
cil when elections were held in the fall of that year. The
Ottumwa Industrial Union Council's efforts in promoting can-
didates were easily pushed aside by a "Good Government
Association" consisting mostly of business and professional
members. ^ ^
JOINT UNION-COMPANY SPONSORSHIP of a month-
long "Morrell Days" celebration in April 1954 symbolically
demonstrated the erosion of the packing community's political
power in Ottumwa. The celebration was meant to provide a
focal point for the initiation of a new spirit of cooperation
among Morrell, Local No. 1, and the city of Ottumwa. Not only
did the union support the new posture of "cooperation," but
Local No. 1 President Louis Crûmes announced that the union
would now be at the forefront of "Morrell boosting." The union
had demonstrated this new commitment by not having called a
single walkout over production decisions in the plant since
October lgSS.'»«
To be sure. Local No. 1 continued after the early 1950s to
fight for improvements in workers' wages and benefits, and it
regularly mobilized its membership behind pro-labor candi-
dates for local, state, and national offices. Thus, for instance.
Local No. 1 garnered considerable rank-and-file support in
1952 and 1956 for Democrat Herschel Loveless's bid for the
Iowa gubernatorial seat. The local's push for Loveless was
39. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 29 April, 27 July, 21 October, 4 November 1953.
Information on Local No. l's lack of financial commitment to the council-
manager city government issue comes from Local No. 1, 21 July 1953 Mem-
bership Meeting, Minute Book, October 1952-February 1955, Local P-1
Records, SHSI.
40. Morrell Magazine, January and April 1954; Local No. 1, 22 March 1954
Special Executive Board Meeting, Minute Book, October 1952-February
1955, Local P-1 Records; National Provisioner, 21 August 1954; Cheever, The
House ofMorrell, 137.
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ironic given their rejection of him during the 1949 city council
campaign.^'
Despite their continued economic successes and their com-
mitment to liberal politicians, by the mid-1950s Local No. l's
earlier goals of increasing worker participation in the compa-
ny's production decisions and extending the direct influence of
the packing community into the city's politics were no longer
tenable. Local No. l's efforts in those areas had been success-
fully thwarted after 1945 by the company and a politicized
business and professional class in Ottumwa. By the mid-1950s.
Local No. 1 no longer embodied the packing community from
which it had originally arisen.
41. In 1952 Loveless won a 72 percent plurality in the city's first precinct, site
of the now eroded immediate packing neighborhood, though he failed to
carry the election in the state. Four years later, when he was victorious. Love-
less won a 74 percent plurality in Ottumwa's first precinct while taking 59
percent of Wapello County's vote. See State of Iowa, Official Register, 1953-
1954 (Des Moines, 1953), 380-83; and State of Iowa, Official Register. 1957-
1958 (Des Moines, 1957), 412-13.
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